We analyze a novel principal-agent problem of moral hazard and adverse selection in continuous time.
Introduction
We investigate a novel problem of optimal dynamic contracting under moral hazard and adverse selection, in which the agent's preference is subject to a constant private shock. Adverse selection is important in practice, as agents (managers) may vary in terms of productivity and preferences, privately known only to themselves. Similarly, investors may lack information on the quality and the future profitability of a project of an entrepreneur who seeks financing.
Despite the important role of adverse selection in managerial compensation and contract design, dynamic contracting literature on this topic is very scarce. 1 To the best of our knowledge, there are no discrete-time models with infinite periods investigating constant private shock and dynamic moral hazard. Sung (2005) was the first to investigate continuous-time contracting with both adverse selection and moral hazard with constant private type, in a model in which a risk-neutral principal hires agents with CARA preferences, and all the decisions are taken at time zero; then, the optimal contract is linear, and effort is constant. Continuoustime papers dealing with pure adverse selection problem subject to repeated persistent shock include Zhang's an agent to manage a project whose drift and outcome are observed only by the agent; the paper assumes that the agent consumes only at a finite horizon and uses a non-standard methodology. 2 Different from those papers, our main methodological contribution is that we extend the continuation value based approach to 1 Dynamic models without adverse selection include the seminal paper by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) , the first to explore continuous-time moral hazard models. Their work was generalized and extended by many authors, including Sung (1993, 1997) , Sung (1995 Sung ( , 1997 . Cvitanić, Wan and Zhang (2008) generalized Holmstrom-Milgrom model to allow for general utility functions. Sannikov (2008) was the first to consider a dynamic moral hazard model with continuous payment, in a model in which the agent's continuation value process is the unique state variable. Williams (2006) investigates a general version of the same problem. Demarzo and Sannikov (2006) analyze dynamic capital security design with hidden savings. Biais, Mariotti, Plantin, and Rochet (2007) consider a model in which the arrival rate of investment opportunities is controlled by the agent. 2 He, Wei and Yu (2012) consider an infinite-horizon variation of the Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) model and study optimal dynamic contracting with endogenous learning. Giat, Hackman, and Subramanian (2010) consider the model in which the project value is observed, but its "risk premium" (drift term) is not observed, and the principal and the agent may have different prior beliefs about it; this is a useful approach for modeling venture capital investments, for example. Similarly, Prat and Jovanovic (2010) extend Sannikov (2008) model to the case of unobserved drift; the problem becomes hard and requires use of the maximum principle from stochastic control theory. Unlike our paper, the settings of these papers do not include adverse selection.
models that combine dynamic moral hazard and adverse selection.
In our model the private shock is constant and it models agent's skill, type or preferences, that remain unchanged throughout the agent's lifetime. In addition, our model involves dynamic moral hazard, which, in combination with a constant private shock, makes the problem difficult. The reason for the difficulty is that the contract payment transferred to the agent not only has to provide instantaneous incentives for the agent to work, but also to provide aggregate incentives for the agent to report the true shock value at time zero.
Dealing with both simultaneously is quite challenging.
The model is a generalization of Sannikov (2008) to the case of adverse selection. He develops a continuation value based approach to explore the dynamic moral hazard problem that is a continuous-time analogue of the model in Spear and Srivastava (1987) . The agent's continuation value is the total future expected utility conditional on the past history. Sannikov (2008) manages to reduce the agent's incentive problem to instantaneous conditions involving the volatility of the continuation value process. In our model, with private information at time zero, it is not enough to consider the volatility of each agent's continuation value, because of the additional concern that the agent may not be truthful about her type. Hence, continuation value is not the only state variable. Rather, we need to consider also the continuation value if the agent untruthfully reports her type, that we call the "temptation value process". The temptation value process, implicitly determined by the payment stream offered to the honest agent, provides incentives to the dishonest agent to exert effort. Then, by restricting the initial value of the temptation value process, the principal can induce the agent to report truthfully. Hence, when the principal designs the contract, he not only needs to consider how to provide incentives for exerting effort from an honest agent, but also how to control the temptation value process of her dishonest counterpart. The continuation value and temptation value processes then both affect the optimal payment stream. That is, the optimal contract is based on two state variables.
The main difficulty relative to the pure moral hazard model, is that, with the continuation value and the temptation value processes being coupled, it is not straightforward to identify appropriate boundary conditions and the domain of the relevant value functions. This domain, called the "credible set", is the set of pair values that can be implemented as expected utility values by admissible payment streams. If a pair consisting of the initial values of the continuation value and the temptation value processes lies outside the credible set, then there exists no payment stream that implements the honest and dishonest agents' expected payoffs at time zero.
Motivated by Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1990) and Sannikov (2007b), we construct a method for computing the credible set. It has two boundaries, that we call "stationary boundary" and "extreme boundary". When the state variable processes reach the stationary boundary of the credible set, the contract is terminated. In our version of the pure moral hazard problem, the contract is terminated (the agent retires) simply when the continuation value reaches the minimum or the maximum possible value. However, when the moral hazard is mixed with adverse selection, it is possible that the contract is terminated at any level of the continuation value process, depending on the temptation value process. The contract of the good agent is terminated when the temptation value process of the bad agent becomes large, as the good agent becomes too expensive to motivate. The contract of the bad agent is terminated when the temptation value process of the good agent becomes small, because the contract offers too few incentives. When the state variable processes reach the extreme boundary of the credible set, they continue moving along the tangential direction of the set. While the stationary boundary is a line, the extreme boundary is more complex, it is a solution to an ordinary differential equation (ODE).
We also consider shutdown contracts, that is, the contracts that the bad agent would not accept. We compare the efficiency of the optimal screening contract and the optimal shutdown contract for different utility reservation values of the bad agent. We find that, when the reservation value is high, it is more profitable for the principal to offer the shutdown contract. When the reservation value is low, it is better for the principal to offer the screening contract (that agents of both types will accept). In static models (see Laffont and Martimort 2002) , a significant inefficiency is a feature of the shutdown contract, because the bad agent will not be producing. In our model, however, it may or may not be more efficient to offer the screening contract. Expanding on Sannikov (2008) , who identifies the "income effect" inefficiency in dynamic moral hazard problems, we find that the good agent's incentives are affected not only by her own income effect, but also by the dishonest agent's income effect. When the reservation value is low, the shutdown contract leads to a low rent for the good agent and the expected utility of the dishonest agent has to be lower than the reservation value. However, low expected payoff for the dishonest agent may reduce incentives to the honest agent. By comparison, under the screening contract and with low reservation value, both the good and bad agents' expected payoffs are not binding at reservation utility, thus providing better incentives to the good agent. When the reservation utility is high and the income effect of the dishonest agent becomes less relevant, then the shutdown contract is better because it brings down the good agent's rent. Hence, we conclude that the screening contract may be better not only because the bad agent does not produce if not offered a contract, but also because screening provides strong incentives to the good agent if the reservation utility is low.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the model and setup. In Section 3 we find the optimal contract with pure moral hazard. In Section 4 we investigate the optimal shutdown contract with both moral hazard and adverse selection. The optimal screening contract is presented in Section 5. We conclude the paper in Section 6. The proofs are presented in the appendix.
Model
Time is continuous. A standard Brownian motion Z = {Z(t), F(t)} t≥0 on (Ω, F, P ) drives the output process.
The total output Y (t) produced up to time t evolves according to
where a(t) is the manager's choice of effort level and σ is a constant. The manager's effort is a stochastic 
The output process Y is publicly observable by both the firm owner and the manager. F Y (t) is the information flow generated by {Y (s)} s≤t . The firm owner cannot observe the manager's effort a or her type θ, known only by the manager. Hence,we have a contracting problem with both adverse selection and moral hazard.
The firm owner offers a menu of contracts
that specifies a bounded flow of payments c i = {c i (t)} t≥0 and desired effort a i = {a i (t)} t≥0 based on his observations of output and the agent's reported type. The desirable level of effort is the level that the firm owner recommends to the manager.
Assume that both the firm owner and the manager discount the flow of profits and utility at a common rate r. If the manager's type is θ i , with payment c i and chosen effort level a i , then her expected utility is given by
and the firm owner is risk neutral with expected profit
Factor r in front of the integrals normalizes the cumulative payoffs to the same scale as the flow payoffs.
Formulation of firm owner's problem
Assume that the reservation utility for managers of both types is R. The owner's problem is then to offer a contract menu {Ψ i } i=g,b that maximizes his profit (??) subject to delivering to the agent a required initial utility value of at least R. We write these "individual reservation" (IR) constraints as
There are also two incentive compatibility conditions: We first derive the optimal contract under pure moral hazard, without adverse selection, as the main benchmark. Next, we derive the "optimal shutdown contract", that is, the contract which deliberately excludes the bad type. Finally, we find the optimal screening contract.
Optimal Contract with Pure Moral Hazard
In this section, we assume that the manager's type is publicly known and discuss optimal contracting under pure moral hazard. This contract can be found by familiar methods that summarize the agent's incentives using her continuation value, i.e., her future expected payoff when she chooses the principal's desired effort, 3 that is
3 Continuation value based methods were developed by Green (1987) It follows from the results below that the unique way of delivering W i (t) = 0 is to offer zero payment after time t, in which case the agent's effort is zero. The corresponding principal's expected profit is F i (0) = 0.
Moreover, the unique way to deliver
t, in which case the agent's optimal effort is a i (s) = 0, for s ≥ t, and so
These are the boundary conditions needed to find the optimal contract in this setting. The method we apply is that of Sannikov (2008) , and the proofs of Lemma ?? and Proposition ?? below, are the same as in that paper, although our pure moral hazard setting differs from Sannikov's (2008) in the boundary conditions.
The following result gives the instantaneous incentive compatibility conditions for the managers.
Lemma 3.1 Given a payment process c i and effort process a i , there exists an adapted process β i such that the agent's continuation value evolves according to
Moreover, the agent with type θ i will optimally exert the recommended effort a i if and only if the following incentive compatibility condition holds:
For the sake of smoother terminology, we introduce the following definition.
Definition 3.2 If (a i , β i ) satisfies instantaneous incentive compatibility condition (??), then we say that β i
enforces effort level a i .
The reason behind the incentive compatibility condition is that the drift of the agent's continuation value in (??) depends on β i a i − g(a i ), so the best response for an agent of type θ i is to maximizes −g(a) + β i a.
Given the desired effort a i , the principal will choose process β i that enforces a i and has the smallest absolute value among such process. The choice of the smallest absolute value process is due to the concavity of the principal's value function, as we will see below. We use γ(a i ) to denote such β i .
Proposition 3.1 The optimal (incentive compatible) contract
{c i (W i (t)), a i (W i (t)
)} is determined by the maximization in the optimality (HJB) equation for the principal's value function
satisfying boundary conditions
Here, W i (t) is the continuation value process of the agent with type θ i following the dynamics (??), and it's initial value is any value such that
An important finding in Sannikov (2008) is that the agent's initial expected payoff at time 0 may be strictly larger than the reservation utility R, if the reservation utility is low enough. A typical form of the value function F i (W ), together with c i (W ) and a i (W ), is shown in Figure 1 . Numerical results show that the optimal contract motivates the good manager to work throughout the contract period. However, it may be too costly for the principal to compensate the bad manager for her effort, and so the desired and optimal effort is 0 when her continuation value is sufficiently large. Moreover, consistent with the findings in Sannikov (2008), if the manager's continuation value is low enough, then even without being payed she still may have an incentive to work in order to move W i (t) away from the low retirement point (equal to zero). 
Optimal Shutdown Contract under Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
Before discussing the optimal screening contract, it is helpful to investigate the shutdown contract first, in which the principal deliberately excludes the bad manager from hiring. Assume that the firm owner only wants to hire the good manager. He offers a contract Ψ g = {c g (s), a g (s)} s≥0 , which only the good manager accepts, whereas the bad manager prefers to take outside opportunity R. The principal's problem is to choose
such that conditions (??) and (??) for the good manager hold, and
Here, the right-hand side is the maximum expected utility that the bad manager can obtain if she takes the shutdown contract. Under constraint (??), she would not do it, rather, she would take the outside opportunity.
Credible set

Definition of credible set
At time 0, the principal offers payment stream c g = {c g (t)} t≥0 , which is progressively measurable with respect
. Both the good and bad managers may choose to take it. When their best efforts are exerted by the managers, their continuation value processes in general will be different. We use W c b = {W c b (t)} t≥0 to denote the bad manager's continuation value, if she takes the contract and behaves optimally. To distinguish it from the continuation value of the good manager, we call it the bad manager's "temptation value process."
We use a superscript "c" in order to distinguish it from W b in the screening contract, which is the bad manager's continuation if she truthfully reports her type and obtains payment stream c b = {c b (t)} t≥0 that is designed for the bad manager. It is crucial to distinguish between W b (t) and W c b (t) in solving for the optimal contracts. Denote the bad manager's best effort choice by a c b = {a c b (t)} t≥0 . By Proposition ??, we have 10) where the conditions of incentive compatibility are
If the good manager takes the contract, W g (t) is the continuation value process of the good manager and
is the increment of the Brownian motion process. If the bad manager takes the contract, W c b (t) is the continuation value process, or "temptation value process," of the bad manager and
is the increment of the Brownian motion process.
When the principal designs the contract, he not only needs to consider the good manager's incentive, as he would in the pure moral hazard setting, but he also needs to identify the possible outcomes if the bad manager takes the contract, and process W c b is the one which summarizes the bad manager's incentives. Hence, the optimal contract design should be based on two state variables, W g and W c b , which are fully coupled through c g and Y . The principal has to satisfy the following constraints: condition (??) for the good manager, equivalent to (??), condition (??), equivalent to (??), and the exclusion condition
Condition (??) states that if the bad manager pretends to be a good manager, then her expected utility at time 0 cannot be better than her reservation R. Hence, only the good manager will take the contract, assuming that
Thus, by utilizing the continuation value processes, we transform the global conditions into instantaneous conditions and initial value conditions, thereby greatly simplifying the contracting problem. It is to be noted that, although asymmetric information exists only at time 0, it has a long-term effect on contract design and the dynamics of optimal contracts.
In order to solve the problem, we will need to identify the right boundary conditions. From the previous section we know that {W c b (t), W g (t)} cannot move outside the feasible set V. However, not every value pair in the feasible set can be implemented by incentive-compatible contracts. Motivated by Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1990) and Sannikov (2007b), we define the "credible set" as follows. In other words, given an initial value pair (w c b , w g ) outside the credible set, there exists no payment stream c = {c(t)} t≥0 taking values in C, such that, if the bad (good) manager takes the contract, then her optimal expected utility at time 0 is w c b ( w g ). That is, given such initial value pair (w c b , w g ), with any payment stream the corresponding pair (W t g , W c b (t)) will move out of the feasible set with positive probability.
Definition 4.3 Consider the set E of initial value pairs
(w c b , w g ) in V for
Characterization of the credible set
Sannikov (2007b) developed a curvature-based approach for characterizing credible sets. Motivated by that work, we introduce a method useful in finding credible sets when the optimal contract is based on several coupled state processes.
We want to know, given W c b (t), what the largest or the smallest expected utility is that the good manager can achieve at time t. We denote the largest utility by U (W c b (t)) and the smallest by L (W c b (t)). Definē
We will show that E =Ē, so we call U (w c b ) (L(w c b )) the upper ( lower) boundary of the credible set. Figure  ? ? presents an example of the credible set. 
)) is the normal vector at the upper (lower) boundary (pointing outward). The parameters are u(c)
To derive U (w c b ), note that we have 15) if the good manager takes the contract. The increment of Brownian motion is dZ
, and the bad manager's temptation process from the good manager's perspective is
P rivate benef it of the bad manager
is the bad manager's instantaneous benefit from the good manager's perspective. We consider the following formulation for U (w c b ). Given a fixed initial time v, the good manager 17) subject to dynamics (??), satisfying (??) and Then, the good manager's expected utility at time t would be 0 (θ g u(c M )).
While in (??) the incentive compatibility condition for the good manager is not explicit, it is implied. The optimal a g is computed by solving
, hence (??) still holds on the upper boundary of the credible set. Similarly, we can find the lower boundary of the credible set as a function W g = L(W c b ). We summarize our main findings for the credible set as follows. 
Proposition 4.3 Upper boundary U (W )of the setĒ is the unique solution of optimality equation (??), that is strictly increasing and strictly concave. The lower boundary is given by equation
) reaches the lower boundary at P * = (θ b w * , θ g w * ) for any w * ∈ [0, u(c M )] at time t, then it will stay at P * forever and the payment stream is a constant c g (s) = c * = v(w * ) for s ≥ t.
That is, the contract is terminated at time t, and the agent is retired with a constant payment c * after time t.
From Proposition ?? we see that the lower boundary is a "stationary boundary", in the sense that the continuation values do not change after hitting it. When a value pair reaches the stationary boundary the agent is retired and receives a constant payment after retirement. The upper boundary is an "extreme boundary" in the sense that the only way to implement an expected payoff pair on the extreme boundary is to make the continuation value and temptation value processes move along the tangent direction on the extreme We have shown that all expected payoff pairs on the boundaries are all achievable. In order to showĒ = E, it remains to show that all expected payoff pairs insideĒ are achievable. Another natural question is if there is any payoff pair inside E which is stationary, that is, such that the only way to implement it is that it remains unchanged. And if there is any pair that is extreme, in the sense that there exists a unique way to achieve it. From the proof of Proposition ??, we already know that no payoff pair inside E is stationary, because there is a path that leads it to the upper boundary. The following corollary implies that no payoff pair inside E is extreme either, because for any pair there is also a path that leads it to the lower boundary. 5
Proposition 4.4Ē = E.
Proof. Given any pair (W
c b (0), W g (0)) = (w c b , w g ) insideĒ, let β g (t) = β c b (t) = a g (t) = a c b (t) = c g (t) = 0 for t ≤ τ ,
Corollary 4.2 There exists a multiple
) ∈ E at time 0, ends at the lower boundary before time T * almost surely, where
and I(.) is the inverse function of U W (.).
For concreteness, we described E as the credible set from the good manager's perspective. However, it is also the credible set from the bad manager's persepctive. This is because E depends on the dynamics of (W c b (t), W g (t)), not on who takes the contract.
Contract design
We now discuss the principal's problem. Denote the principal's value function by J g (W c b , W g ) if the good manager takes the contract. It is dependent on two state variables: the good manager's continuation value process and the bad manager's temptation process. We denote the first-order derivatives with respect to W g 
5 Thus, for any pair inside E, there are at least two different paths that can achieve it. In fact, if the pair is inside E, the choice ) on the extreme boundary, hence those terms can be written as deterministic functions of W g only. We now state the boundary conditions for the principal's value function. By "boundary conditions" we mean the description of the credible set and the properties of the solution at its boundaries.
Lemma 4.2 On the stationary (extreme) boundary,
, and K U,g (W g ) is the solution to
Here, as discussed above, vector (c g (
is the optimal solution determined by optimality equation (??). 
Also on the extreme boundary, the bad manager will not work if W g is small, but this does not mean β c b is zero, because it still may be better to provide incentives to the good manager to work. Our numerical results also show that, with the fixed continuation value W g , the principal's value on the stationary boundary (a larger temptation value) is larger than that on the extreme boundary (a smaller temptation value), because the cost to maintain the truthfulness of the bad manager dominates the profit realized by the manager's work on the upper boundary. The extreme and stationary boundaries are inefficient in the sense that the principal cannot generate positive profit at the boundaries. In Figure ? ?, we present surface maps of the principal's value function and the payment to the good manager. In Sannikov (2008) , where only dynamic moral hazard is considered, the principal's value function is non-monotonic in the continuation value of the manager. From Figure ? ?, we can see that the principal's value function is not only non-monotonic in the continuation value, but also non-monotonic in the temptation value. More precisely, given W g , the principal's value is low if the temptation value is either very small or very large.
This non-monotonicity of the value function stems from the inefficiency at the boundary of the credible set and has a large impact on the optimal contract. More precisely, from optimality equation (??), we can see that the optimal choice of compensation maximizes
Thus , the agent's compensation is zero when Moreover, the inefficiency of the credible set's boundaries is due to double-sided income effects. First, when the continuation value of the good manager is sufficiently large, it costs the principal too much to compensate the manager for her effort, which is the inefficiency of the extreme boundary. Second, if the bad manager's temptation value becomes larger whereas the continuation value of the good manager remains the same, it is costly to provide incentives to the bad manager, hence even more costly for the good manager.
Thus, it is optimal for the principal to retire the manager if W c b is sufficiently large, which is the inefficiency of the stationary boundary.
Because the principal's value function is non-monotonic in both W g and W c b , the shutdown contract may be suboptimal compared to the screening contract, if the reservation utility is small. The principal may prefer to (potentially) hire either manager, by raising the initial value of W c b above R, to obtain a greater profit from the good manager's work.
Optimal contract
Having described the boundary conditions, we can now describe the optimal shutdown contract. The following definition adopts the jargon of the repeated games literature.
Definition 4.4 Define set D(R)
= {(w c b , w g ) ∈ E, such that w c b ≤ R and w g ≥ R} . Set D
(R) is called the "initially and individually rational set " when the reservation utility is R.
Set D(R) is the set of expected payoff pairs at time zero, such that the good manager will take the contract, and the bad manager will not.
As in the rest of the paper, we assume that there exists a strictly concave solution for optimality equation 
We have the following result. 
Proposition 4.5 The optimal contract is given by
Figure ?? provides numerical results for optimal initial values W g (0) and W c b (0) given different reservation utilities R. Note that when w * b ≤ R ≤ w * g , the initial values are unchanged, set at those levels. This is because
Another interesting observation is that, although the principal does not want to hire the bad manager, when R ≤ w * b her participation constraint (??) is as high as possible for the shutdown contract, that is, binding at R. The reason is that the principal value function is not monotonic in W c b , and can be increased by raising W c b in that region. This implies that the principal can do better by offering the screening contract instead of the shutdown contract when the reservation value is sufficiently low.
We conclude this section with Figure ? ?, which describes how the principal's expected profit changes with respect to reservation value R. In the pure moral hazard model, if R is less than the point denoted w 0 g , it is good for the principal to raise the agent's expected utility, otherwise the manager's continuation value has a large chance of hitting the low retiring value zero. However, when the moral hazard is mixed with adverse selection, the principal's value is also dependent on the temptation process, whose initial value cannot be greater than the reservation utility. Hence the shutdown contract is costly if the reservation value is low. We indicate now what the optimal solutions should depend on in our framework. We define the continuation value process for the bad agent and the temptation value process for the good agent, as follows.
Here, β b (t) enforces a b (t) and β c g (t) enforces a c g (t). In addition to J g (W c b , W g ), defined previously, we introduce the optimal expected profit J b (W b , W c g ) of the principal when hiring the bad manager. Then, the principal's optimal profit from issuing a screening contract is obtained by maximizing
where
] are initial values.
Optimality equation
We first need to identify the credible set of (W b (t), W c g (t)). Note that the feasible set and the dynamic structure of (W b (t), W c g (t)) are the same as those of (W c b (t), W g (t)). Hence, the credible set of (
) is on the extreme boundary at time t, the only implementable contract is defined
which are deterministic functions of W g and determined by optimality equation (??). In characterizing the contract for the bad manager, if the continuation value and temptation value processes reach the extreme boundary at (W b , W c g ), then the unique contract that keeps the value pair in credible set is the same as that for the good manager with W c g replacing
The difference relative to the shutdown case is that in the screening contract the initial conditions for (W c b (0), W g (0)) and (W b (0), W c g (0)) have to be such that the managers will only accept the contract designed for their type. In the bad manager's contract, the increment of Brownian motion is dZ(t) = 
Similar to Lemma ??, on the extreme boundary the principal's value function is 30) where
) is the solution to
On the stationary boundary, same as in the contract for the good manager, the agent will be offered a constant payment stream v(
Hence the principal's value function on the stationary boundary is
) . 
Next, we note that the optimal value function of the principal if the bad manager is hired satisfies 
The proportions p b and p g of good and bad managers in the labor market have no impact on contract dynamics, but they affect the initial values of the continuation and temptation processes, as seen from the following result. 
The foregoing corollary is illustrated by Figure ? ?. If the reservation utility is small, then both managers' expected utilities at time zero are not binding at R. The principal is better off increasing the utilities to the level (w
). Meanwhile, the optimal screening contract represents a weakly separating equilibrium: both managers are indifferent between truth-telling and lying. However, the contract is not a pooling one, the payments and efforts are different. The principal may obtain a strictly separating equilibrium by increasing W g (0) and W b (0) by a tiny value ϵ. When the reservation utility is large, the initial value of the bad manager's continuation value W b (0) is binding at R. The initial value of the good manager's continuation process is equal to the initial value of her temptation process. The binding of W b (0) at R implies that it is suboptimal for the principal to offer the screening contract when the reservation utility is large. Rather, the shutdown contract should be offered, as seen in Figure ? ?. 
Most of the arguments in favor of the screening contracts in the static models literature is based on the assumption that the labor is in short supply and the principal will suffer a loss if he hires the good manager only. If the market has a sufficient supply of both types of managers, then this argument is no longer valid.
Our model shows that if the common reservation utility is low, then it is too costly and inefficient to hire only good managers, because the optimal shutdown contract needs to ensure that the bad manager's initial temptation value is no larger than the reservation utility, which damages the good manager's incentives. By increasing the bad manager's initial temptation value, the principal's expected profit may increase. In this case, the screening contract is better, with optimally chosen initial value that is not binding at the common reservation value. However, if the reservation utility is high, it becomes too expensive to hire a bad manager.
The bad manager's expected utility in the screening contract is binding at the reservation value, which implies that the principal would prefer the bad manager to have a low reservation value. Then, the shutdown contract should be offered, because it specifies the initial value of the temptation process for the bad manager that is lower than the reservation value. In practice, screening contracts are not used for top management positions such as CEO's, who have high reservation utility values. However, these contracts may be optimal for positions with low reservation utility values.
Optimal screening contract: a simulation exercise
In this section, we illustrate the features of the optimal screening contract by a simulation of one particular event history. 
Conclusion
This paper considers a dynamic principal-agent problem with moral hazard that is present continuously, and adverse selection that occurs only at time zero. We derive the optimal contracts for good and bad managers, each of which is based on the honest manager's continuation value and the dishonest manager's temptation value. We find that it may be optimal for the agent to retire early, at varying levels of the manager's continuation value. Different from Sannikov (2008) , in which the manager is retired either with zero or the highest payment, in our model retirement may occur at different levels of payment. Another finding is that the principal's value function is a function of two state variables, and is not only non-monotonic in the continuation values, but is also non-monotonic in the temptation values, due to the inefficiency of the credible set's boundary, caused by the double-sided income effects of the managers. We have shown that, when the common reservation utility is high, it is better for the principal to offer the shutdown contract to lower the information rent paid to the good manager. When the reservation utility is low, it is better to offer the screening contract, and raise the expected payoff for the bad manager at time zero so that the good manager can be offered better incentives.
Our model also could, in principle, be applied to investigate financial contracts and capital security design subject to constant private shocks. That is, one could extend the model of DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) by allowing the manager to have private knowledge of the constant quality of the project 8 . Based on the results of this paper, we conjecture that the credible set would consist of two boundaries, a stationary boundary on which the financial contract is terminated, and a reflective boundary, on which the agent is paid. Moreover, our approach could be generalized to the case of effort taking values in a continuous range. It would be of interest also to extend it to the case in which the agent's type is being exposed to repeated persistent shocks and dynamic moral hazard. 9
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A Proof of Proposition ??
To show that the recursive, DPP formulation (??) holds, and without the need of imposing condition (??), we need to make explicit the weak formulation of the model, that is, that the agent is controlling the probability measure by his actions. 10 More precisely, we work on a probability space (Ω, F, P 0 ), on which Z 0 (t) is a standard Brownian motion such that 1 σ dY (t) = dZ 0 (t). Hence, the information flow generated by Z 0 (t) is equivalent to { F Y (t) }
t≥0
. Girsanov theorem implies that there is a measure P ag such that Z ag t (t) = Z 0 (t) − ∫ t 0
ag(s)
σ ds is also a standard Brownian motion, where
Then, dY (t) = a g (t)dt + σdZ ag (t).
Moreover, the expected values in the main body of the paper, related to the good agent, are (implicitly assumed to be) taken under the measure P ag , that is, E(.) = E ag (.) Switching to the original measure P 0 , the upper boundary problem is equivalent to U (w 
D Proof of Corollary ??
Because (w c b , w g ) is inside E, we have l(W c b (0), W g (0)) < 0 and l(W c b (t), W g (t)) is decreasing for t > 0. Thus, the continuation value pair (W c b (t), W g (t)) moves from a boundary of one level set to another, lower one, in the direction from L 1 to L 2 (for example) as shown in Figure ? ?. We don't know when the first time is at which (W c b (t), W g (t)) hits the lower boundary, but we can find a deterministic time T * , that depends on (w c b , w g ), such that (W c b (t), W g (t)) will end on the lower boundary before time T * , almost surely. Define H(t) = l(W c b (t), W g (t)), with H(0) = w g − U (w c b ) < 0. As time passes, eventually the boundary of the level set on which (W c b (t), W g (t)) finds itself, will be tangent to the lower boundary of the feasible set, as shown by point B in Figure ??, with B = (w c  b ,w g ). Then, we havē
